

Hazard Identification & Asset (network) Vulnerability (Resilience) Assessment

UCL CEGE, UK

Dina D'AYALA, Pierre GEHL, Khaled TALIB, Mira WANG

CSIC, Spain

María-José JIMÉNEZ and Mariano GARCÍA-FERNÁNDEZ

Final Dissemination Conference 29 September 2016, Madrid, Spain







Objectives / Challenges


- Spatial extent of critical infrastructure → components may be exposed to a wide range of hazard types
- How to reconcile damage events from different hazard types?
- How to harmonize multi-risk assessment over the whole infrastructure?
- → Use of a Bayesian framework to assemble hazard-specific fragility curves
- Interdependency between infrastructure elements → high dimensionality of the space of solutions
- Functionality loss of elements is more important than direct repair costs
- Spatial consistency of hazard input (i.e. scenario-based approaches)
- → Application of Bayesian Networks in complement to simulation-based methods (e.g. FP7 SYNER-G project, OOFIMS tool)?





Single and Multi-Risk Assessment

Interactions at the HAZARD level



- → Generation of cascading hazard events and joint independent hazard events
- → Spatial (geographical extent of infrastructure) and temporal (return periods of source events) modelling






Single and Multi-Risk Assessment

- Interactions at the EXPOSURE/VULNERABILITY level?
- Spatial extent of critical infrastructure → components may be exposed to a wide range of hazard types
- How to reconcile damage events from different hazard types?
- How to harmonize multi-risk assessment over the whole infrastructure?
- Development of a method to derive fragility models that are consistent between hazard types
- Use of a Bayesian framework to assemble hazard-specific fragility curves
- Application to roadway bridges, exposed to earthquakes (EQ), fluvial floods (FL) and ground failures (GF)





Overview of the proposed approach




IM evidence





Harmonized fragility functions







Multi-hazard scenarios

- Multi-risk event taxonomy proposed by Lee & Steinberg (2008):
 - Single event;
 - Combined events: single event triggering multiple loading mechanisms;
 - Subsequent events: unrelated single events triggered by different sources and possibly separated in time;

- Proposed multi-risk scenarios:
 - *Single* event: flood (**FL**)
 - *Combined* events: earthquake-induced ground failure (**EQ** → **GF**)
 - Subsequent events: flood follow by an earthquake (FL + EQ → GF)
- → Multi-risk fragility framework should be consistent with all these cases





Seismic Hazard Modelling

CSIC, Spain

(María-José JIMÉNEZ and Mariano GARCÍA-FERNÁNDEZ)

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


Seismic Hazard Approach

- Development of a seismic hazard approach best suited to consider low probability ground motions affecting critical transport infrastructures networks.
- Probabilistic-based approach applying Monte Carlo simulation techniques (the most adapted when dealing with low-probability ground motions)
 - Allows for building **long-duration synthetic earthquake catalogues** (3×10⁶ years) to derive low-probability ground motions
 - More powerful and flexible handling of uncertainties, and making straightforward the link with probabilistic risk analysis
 - Provides a distribution of maximum ground-motion amplitudes that follow a general extreme-value distribution
 - Facilitates the analysis of the occurrence of extremes, i.e., very low probability of exceedance, from unlikely combinations; which could be applied in the development of stress tests
- Development of extreme motion hazard deterministic scenarios







Seismic Hazard Model

Extreme ground-motion scenarios for selected combinations of modelling inputs which include:

- (a) Seismic activity model (4)
- (b) Ground motion model (2)
- (c) Hazard level (3)
- (d) Fractile of extreme ground motions (3)
- Value at the **reference site** is the extreme ground motion corresponding to the selected hazard level (*i.e.*, annual probability of being exceeded) and fractile/percentile (p) of extreme values (*i.e.*, only 100-p% of extremes are larger)
- Assuming that the same parameters generating the extreme value at the centre apply to all grid points, extreme motion hazard deterministic scenarios (72 scenarios) are obtained for the whole hazard region







Seismic Activity Models

Derived from area source model of European SHARE project

- ➤ **High activity** (from SHARE_Active 203 sources, 31% area)
- ➤ Moderate activity (from SHARE_SCR-Ext 80 sources, 40% area)
- ➤ Moderate-to-low activity (from SHARE_SCR-NoExt 17 sources, 15% area)
- ➤ Low activity (from SHARE_SCR-Shield 8 sources, 13% area)



SHARE
Area Source Model v6.1 (2013)









Seismic Activity Models

Seismic Activity Model	N _o /yr	β	weight	z(km)	weight	M _{max}	weight
High activity (SHARE_Active)	28571	1.950	0.10	2.5	0.10	7.00	0.50
	28571	2.303	0.60	10.0	0.40	7.20	0.20
	107143	2.000	0.10	18.0	0.50	7.40	0.20
	107143	2.303	0.10			8.00	0.10
	214286	2.303	0.10				
Moderate activity (SHARE_SCR-Ext)	143	2.150	0.15			6.50	0.50
	2857	2.303	0.85	uniform		6.70	0.20
				2 - 22		6.90	0.20
						7.10	0.10
Moderate-to-low activity (SHARE_SCR-NoExt)	214	2.303	0.50			6.50	0.50
	2143	2.303	0.50		uniform	6.75	0.20
					2 - 26	6.95	0.20
						7.20	0.10
Low activity (SHARE_SCR-Shield)	264	2.303	0.75			6.50	0.50
	514	2.303	0.25		uniform	6.70	0.20
					30-35	6.90	0.20
						7.10	0.10





Ground Motion Models

Two models based on those developed by Atkinson and Adams (2013) in the 2015 edition of the National Building Code of Canada, for $V_{\rm S30}$ =760 m/s soils

- **➢ Generic Low Attenuation** (*derived from ENA*)
- **➢ Generic High Attenuation** (*derived from Wcrust*)

Hazard level

Three levels of **annual probability**, P1, of exceeding ground-motion values at the reference site: 4×10^{-4} , 2×10^{-4} , and 10^{-4} per year. They correspond to mean return periods of 2,500, 5,000, and 10,000 years ($1/P1 = mean \ return \ period$)

Fractile of extreme ground-motions

Three options of **fractiles** of extreme ground-motion values at the reference site: **0.50**, **0.75** and **0.90**. They refer to percentile, p, of 50th, 75th, and 90th (i.e., only 100-p% of extremes are larger)





Spatial Variability

Hypothesis: Spatial correlation (covariance) not direction dependent


Approach: Running averaging window on a 2D normal random field

10,000 random fields

Selected 18 realizations:

< 2% distortion in reference site

=> 1296 scenarios








Scenario example

High activity & Generic Low Attenuation & 2×10⁻⁴ & 0.50







From Asset damage to network damage

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The INFRARISK case-study





ltaly major roads



0 100 200 400 Kilometers








The INFRARISK case-study Bologna area












- Historic flood events












- Landslide susceptibility












- Seismic zonation












- Aggregated hazard












Criticity of infrastructure

- Betweenness centrality











Exposure model

- Taxonomy of bridges

Name: Type of Column section 1: Rectangular

Note: Type of Column section 2: Solid

 Where: 11.295521, 44.494518
 Spans: Multi-span

 Material MM1: Concrete
 Span length: 25-45m

Material MM2: Prestressed concrete Connection to abutment: Isolated (through bearings)


Bridge width: <20m Bridge configuration: Regular
Bridge length: <50m Type of deck 1: Undefined
Deck structural system: Simply supported Type of deck 2: Undefined

Pier to deck connection: Isolated (through bearings) Number of columns for pier: Undefined

Type of pier: Multi-column pier Pier height: Undefined

Level of seismic design: Seismic design Number of spans: Undefined













- Seismic fragility curves













- Multi-risk fragility functions












- Multi-risk fragility functions











Abutment approach (embankment) Fragility model - Multi-risk fragility functions Abutment Abutment foundation Shear key 8.0 column Bearing (Ö __ 0.6 ☐ 0.8 O 0.4 ☐ 0.4 Pier foundation 0.2 4000 6000 Earthquak 1000 2000 3000 5000 Q [m³/s] Flood foundation Shear Shear **Bearing** keys (FL) keys (EQ) INFR Deck Deck unseatin







Abutment approach (embankment) Fragility model - Multi-risk fragility functions Abutment Abutment foundation Shear key column ----- Scour = D0 ; Flood = D0 Bearing ---- Scour = D1 ; Flood = D0 Scour = D2; Flood = D0 Pier foundation Scour = D0; Flood = D1 P (Ds ≥ D_i I Q) Scour = D1; Flood = D1 Scour = D2 ; Flood = D1 0.4 Earthquak 0.2 Flood 16 PGA [m²/s] foundation Shear Shear Bearing keys (FL) keys (EQ) INFR Deck Deck unseatin








Abutment approach (embankment) Fragility model - Multi-risk fragility functions Functionality Level FL1 Functionality Level FL2 Abutment Abutment foundation Shear key column Bearing PGA [m/s²] PGA [m/s2] Pier foundation Functionality Level FL3 Functionality Level FL4 **Earthquak** Flood 5 PGA [m/s²] foundation Shear Shear **Bearing** keys (FL) keys (EQ) INFR Deck Deck unseatin








- Multi-risk fragility functions














Physical damage map

- Seismic damage to bridges

Damage states are randomly sampled given the damage probabilities












Functional consequences

- Impacted road segments

Damage states are randomly sampled given the damage probabilities












Physical damage map

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


Functional consequences

- Impacted road segments

Damage states are randomly sampled given the damage probabilities









From Physical damage to functionality loss and resilience

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Bridge failure modes

> Identification of around 50 damage mechanisms → what are their effects on

the bridge functionality?




Review and taxonomy of qualitative damage scales

/pe	Failure mode	Damage 'Severity'	Description
	Debris accumulation	-	- Reduction of flow capacity - Backup of water flow
	Channel modification	-	- Shifting/migration of waterway channel alignment





Proposed strategy










Application to a bridge example



Multi-Span Simply-Supported Concrete (MSSSC) bridge proposed by Nielson (2005)

22 vulnerable components when considering both loading directions:

1 324	B ₃ B ₄ SH ₄	SH ₅	2x A2px
Along Aligh	,		721
Y direction	P _{ty}	P _{2y}	B ₆
SH ₁	P tx	- 1	

				Damage 'Severity'			
ID	Component	Failure mode	EDP	DS1	DS2	DS3	DS4
1	Pier	Bending	Section curvature	0.005	0.008	0.014	0.020(X)
				0.015	0.024	0.041	0.061 (Y)
4	Abutment	Piles	Deformation in	7.6	25.4	200.0	-(X)
			tension [mm]	7.6	25.4	200.0	-(Y)
5	Abutment	Backfill	Deformation in	19.2	25.4	_	192.0 (X)
			compression [mm]	_	_	_	-(Y)
6	Shear key	-	Deformation [mm]	_	_	_	-(X)
				25.0	25.5	25.5	$406.0 \; (Y)$
13	Fixed	-	Deformation [mm]	10.5	10.5	12.5	152.0 (X)
	bearing			_	_	_	-(Y)
	Expansion	-	Deformation [mm]	10.5	25.0	34.5	$152.0\ (X)$
	bearing			_	_	_	-(Y)

Identification of 18 failure modes at the component level

X direction





Functionality models at component level

Expert-based survey

Functionality models for downtime duration and functional losses





Current limits:


- Limited amount of data points
- No 'seed' questions





Statistical treatment ('pooling')











Functional loss models








Component fragility curves

- Non-linear dynamic time-history analyses of a finite element model of the bridge:
- The response of each component is taken separately to derive component fragility curves
- The responses of all components are used to build a correlation matrix (accounting for statistical dependence)









Correlation between damage events Statistical dependence Introduction of a Dunnett-Sobel class of variables:

$$Z_i = \sqrt{1-\sum_{j=1}^k r_{ij}^2} \cdot V_i + \sum_{j=1}^k r_{ij} \cdot U_j$$
 Approximation of the correlation matrix between of Z_i safety factors:

$$\rho_{il} \approx \sum_{ij}^{k} r_{ij} \cdot r_{lj}$$

- $V_i \rightarrow$ Standard normal variable specific to each component
- $U_i \rightarrow$ Standard normal variable common to all components






Representation of the variables in a Bayesian Network





Assembling failure modes









Derivation of functionality loss curves

- Solving of the Bayesian Network for increasing values of IM
- Observing the updating of the probabilities at nodes S1 and S2




 Observing the updated probability at node SYS provides access to joint probabilities of occurrence:







Application to a road network analysis



- Virtual proof-of-concept for illustration purposes
- Each edge is assumed to contain a bridge (111 bridges)
- Seismic events are probabilistically sampled (Monte-Carlo simulation)
- Network is assumed to link 5 cities of interest

Performance Indicator 1 = averaged ratio of increased travel times between selected cities:

$$R_{TT} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{TT_{i,d}}{TT_{i,0}}$$

For n inter-city travels (n = 10)

Performance Indicator 2 = *single connectivity loss between each city:*

$$SCL = 1 - \left\langle \frac{N_{s,j,d}}{N_{s,j,0}} \right\rangle_{j}$$


For *j* = 1..5 (# of cities)





Annual probability of exceedance

- The empirical CDF of the performance indicator is derived from 5,000 runs
- Assumed seismic activity parameter: 0.01 annual rate of EQ occurrence



More refined capacity-based performance indicators would require high computational costs (e.g. traffic models, etc.)





Computation of the resilience index Performance indicator (system loss): $1 \sum_{n=1}^{n} TT_{i,d}$


$$R_{TT} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{TT_{i,d}}{TT_{i,0}}$$

Proposed measure for remaining functionality:

$$Q(t) = \frac{1}{R_{TT}}$$

Definition of the resilience index:

$$R = \int_{t=0}^{T_C} \frac{Q(t)}{T_C} dt$$




Each sampled damage scenario leads to a different resilience index

→ probability distribution?



Evaluation of restoration strategies Assumption : only one repair team available (restoration sequence)

- Three restoration schemes are evaluated:
 - 1. Work in priority on the bridges with heaviest functional losses
 - 2. Work in priority on the bridges with lightest functional losses
 - 3. Work in priority on the bridges that have the highest impact on the network performance







Conclusions

- Merits of Bayesian Networks to assess joint probabilities of occurrence and to decompose complex events at smaller scales (from system to components and viceversa)
- Component-level damage mechanisms provide a better resolution of the functional consequences
- Efficient and innovative seismic hazard approach to handle low-probability extreme ground motions and derive associated deterministic scenarios
- The two procedures above can be successfully sued to determine network physical damage scenarios
- Need to improve the knowledge of functionality models for various failure modes
- Functionality curves may be derived for other hazard types since they provide a harmonized 'damage' scale
- Application to a real-life network is underway







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This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement No. 603960

